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Mark Tushnet*
T seems  to  me  essential  to distinguish  between  Professor  Acker-
man's project and the specific content he gives it.'  Most of his crit-
ics have focused  on, and found fault in, the content of We  the People.'
On the whole,  I  agree with  them  about  the  content, although-be-
cause I think  the project  the  right one  for constitutional  law (note,
law, not theory)-I am more willing to apply a principle of charity in
interpretation  than is usual for me.
Here I want to discuss the project, with one important comment on
its content.  After describing the project and why I believe it to be the
right one, I argue that Professor Ackerman  has made his  project un-
necessarily positivist.  This disables him from making analytic-as dis-
tinct from  rhetorical-points  about  the  possibility  of  a  considered
rejection of the New Deal regime.3
Professor Ackerman's  project is to characterize  the project of con-
stitutional law.  That project, in turn, is to constitute the people of the
United States.  We  do so, he argues,  by constructing  a narrative that
creates  a single  people out of many-both  a  contemporary  plurality
and a plurality across time and, in his term, generations.  I think that is
why he describes  efforts  to detach  ourselves from the  narratives that
have heretofore  constituted  us  and to make independent  legal judg-
ments in such critical terms.4  Those who try are heroes, of course, but
they are heroes in the sense  that Sisyphus was  a hero.5
* Carmack  Waterhouse Professor  of Constitutional  Law, Georgetown  Univer-
sity Law Center.  Some passages in this Response  appear as well in What Then Is the
American? 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 873 (1996),  and Living in a Constitutional  Moment?:  Lo-
pez and Constitutional Theory, 46  Case W. Res. L.  Rev. 845  (1996).
1. The temptation to mention Professor Dworkin's distinction  between concepts
and conceptions is irresistible.
2.  Bruce Ackerman, We The People:  Foundations  (1991).
3.  The term considered  is important here.  I take Professor Ackerman's criticisms
of Professor Tribe and Justice Thomas to rest precisely  on the point that  their rejec-
tion of the New Deal regime is unconsidered because of their undefended devotion to
formalism.  I would suppose that the difficulty would be different if Tribe and Thomas
offered a defense of formalism other than the definitional, "It's just not constitutional
law,"  that is explicit in Tribe's  article. See Laurence  H. Tribe,  Taking Text and Struc-
ture Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form  Method in Constitutional  Interpretation,  108
I-Iarv. L. Rev. 1221,  1247  (1995).
4.  Although it seems  to me that, on Professor Ackerman's premises, there  really
can never  be a truly independent legal judgment-only  a judgment  embedded  in an
effort  to construct  an  alternative  narrative.  Perhaps  independent means  something
like,  "This  judgment  is  embedded  in  a  narrative  entirely  discontinuous  with  our
course to this point."  It remains a puzzle, however, how anyone could ever make that
kind of judgment.
5.  It seems worth  noting as well that Professor Ackerman is systematically  am-
biguous in his  explicit statements  about whether his project is merely  descriptive,  or
normative  as well.  At the same  time, his normative stance of approval of the New
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A historical  narrative  connecting  us to  our  past is  important  be-
cause it acknowledges  and promotes the fundamental human good of
connection between people.  We are not monads simply pursuing our
individually  constituted  projects  unaffected  in  principle  by  anyone
else.  We are  embedded in historically  created supra-individual  enti-
ties-families, neighborhoods,  a nation-and  we  are  constrained  by
them  and  responsible  for  them  simultaneously.  The  experience  of
constraint and responsibility is  an important human value.6
That alone will not buy us much, however.  Having connections  to
historically  embedded  communities  either  may  be  a  fundamental
human  good,  which  all  social orders  ought  to  seek  to  achieve,  or  it
may be an inescapable  aspect of the human condition.  Still, one can
be connected  to many  such  communities:  one's family  or one's reli-
gious group, for example.  Preserving a national identity of the sort we
have  in the  United  States  is important  only if being  connected  to a
historically  constructed political community  is a fundamental  human
good or aspect of the human condition.
Families  and neighborhoods  differ  from larger political  communi-
ties.  In a  family  or neighborhood  you  are  responsible  for and con-
strained  by  people  who  you  know  personally.  Larger  political
communities differ in two ways.  Only in them do you have the experi-
ence  of constraint  by  and  responsibility  for people  merely  because
they are people.7  Perhaps more important, larger political communi-
ties are composed  of people  who are  very different from  you.  Your
experience of constraint by and responsibility for such people deepens
and enriches your  own life.8
A people can  be constituted in many ways.  But any  one people is
historically constituted in only one way.  And here is  where constitu-
tional law comes in.  It is, or should be, a commonplace  that the peo-
ple  of the United States  are constituted  by the Constitution.  "What
then  is  the  American,  this  new  man?"  wrote  Hector  St.  John
Crevecoeur in 1782.9  The American, according to Crevecoeur, was "a
new  race  of  men,"  a  mixture  of the peoples  who  had settled  in  its
territory.1 0  A person "becomes an American by being received in the
Deal transformation,  for example,  seems  obvious.  For reasons I discuss below, Pro-
fessor Ackerman's ambiguity may arise  from his failure  to characterize  the Constitu-
tion's  project  appropriately-that  is,  with  reference  to  the  principles  of  the
Declaration of Independence.
6.  This is the truth in modem communitarian  thinking, however overstated  are
the conclusions that some communitarians  draw from that truth.
7.  Some religious  communities may  support similar  experiences,  depending  on
the content of the religious beliefs that constitute them.
8.  See Jeremy  Waldron,  Legislation, Authority, and Voting,  84  Geo.  L.J.  2185
(1996).
9.  J. Hector St. John Crevecour, Letters from an American Farmer 54  (Fox, Duf-
field  & Co. 1904)  (1782).
10.  Id  at 55.
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broad lap  of our great Alma Mater."11  This new man "acts upon new
principles."' 2  For Crevecoeur, the most important new principle was
equality of station, arising in part from the material abundance  of the
land but in part from the principles  on which the new  world was or-
ganized:  "From nothing to start into being; from a servant to the rank
of a master; from being the slave of some despotic prince, to become a
free man,  invested  with  lands, to  which  every municipal  blessing  is
annexed!"' 3  As Crevecoeur saw it, the homogenizing influence of ma-
terial abundance  and principles  of equality would  eliminate  the con-
flicts  Europeans  experienced  arising  from  national  allegiances  and
religious  diversity:  "[T]he  Americans  become  as  to  religion,  what
they are as to country, allied to all.  In them the name of Englishman,
Frenchman, and European is lost, and in like manner, the strict modes
of Christianity  as practiced  in Europe are lost also."'"
Two generations later Frances Wright, a social reform lecturer from
Great Britain, asked the same question-"What  is it to be an Ameri-
can?"-and offered the same answer:  "They are Americans who have
complied with the constitutional  regulations  of the United  States...
[and] wed the principles of America's  declaration to their hearts and
render the duties of Americans  practically to their lives.' 5
The narrative of the people of the United States must be a constitu-
tional narrative.' 6  But, I think, not just any constitutional narrative.
We are self-creating, and so have the power to reconstitute  ourselves
at will.  We can reject the New Deal regime if we choose, and in doing
so-if we do indeed so choose-we would reconstitute ourselves as a
people.  Professor Ackerman's positivism looks to the self-constituting
acts of the people of the United States to provide the raw material for
narratives  that others-primarily,  in his argument, judges-will later
synthesize.  And, although synthesis of the New Deal and its rejection
might be difficult, it surely is  not impossible  in  principle.  A genera-
tion from now, I can imagine, there might be a single story line con-
necting  1789,  1868, 1937 and-when?  2000?  2004?
Yet Professor  Ackerman's  tirade  against  today's  "midgets"  shows
that he wants to say that that story line, though a coherent narrative of
the people of the United  States, would not be a good  one.  I do not
see how his positivism gives him the resources  to do so.
11.  Id
12.  Id. at 56.
13.  Id. at 79.
14.  Id. at 62.
15.  Address by Frances Wright, in Cincinnati,  Ohio, printed in The Beacon  (Mar.
17,  1838),  quoted in  Werner  Sollors,  Beyond  Ethnicity.  Consent  and  Descent  in
American  Culture 152 (1986)  [hereinafter Wright, Address].
16.  Seen in  this  way,  constitutional  law has  no  strong  connections  to  what  the
courts do, although, as Professor Ackerman has argued, on some matters and at some
times  the courts  can help  construct  the people's  self-understanding,  particularly  as
times of regime change  recede.
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But  there  is  a  way  out.  Frances  Wright  referred  not  only  to  the
Constitution  but  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence."  Professor
Ackerman's work is striking in the degree to which the Declaration of
Independence  and Abraham  Lincoln, the Declaration's  primary con-
stitutional  expositor,  are  simply  not  present.  From  this  alternative
point of view, the key to Reconstruction is not what happened in 1868,
but the "new birth of freedom"  occasioned  by the  Civil War.
I think it unnecessary to spell out in detail the Declaration's princi-
ples.18  In contemporary  terms, we would say that they are the princi-
ples  of rationally  defensible  universal  human rights in the service  of
self-government-universal,  because  all  people  are  created  equal;
rights, because all people are endowed with inalienable rights; and in
the service of self-government, because  governments rest on the  con-
sent of the governed.  They must have reasoned justifications  because
of a decent respect for the opinions  of mankind, and because, in  the
words of The Federalist  Papers,  the United States proposed to create a
republic by reflection and choice.
Note that Lincoln's new birth of freedom renewed the Declaration's
commitment  to  equality,  thereby  constructing  the narrative  connec-
tion to the Founding.  In this perspective,  too, the New Deal's substan-
tive commitments matter.  Freedom from fear and freedom from want
continue the Declaration's project.
Here is how I would carry out the project of constructing a coherent
narrative  in  which  the  Constitution  constitutes  the  people  of  the
United  States.  We  are  constituted  by  the  Declaration's  principles,
which the written Constitution only imperfectly realizes. 19  The histor-
ical project  of the  people  of  the United  States  has  been  to  realize
those  principles  increasingly  extensively-in  Wright's  terms,  to
"render"  them "practically  to [our]  lives. "20
That project must avoid two serious but unfortunately common mis-
steps.  We could mistakenly treat the Declaration and the Constitution
as the organic seeds of a process that has been working itself out over
history, almost without regard to what the people of the United States
actually choose.  That denies that we are dealing with a project,  that is,
a self-creating  activity in which the people of the United States  daily
17.  Wright, Address, supra note  15.
18.  I gather that the position I am describing is something like what contemporary
jurisprudence refers to as inclusive legal positivism. I am unacquainted with the rele-
vant literature, however, and therefore  do not intend to support my position by refer-
ring to that literature.
19.  From this perspective Professor Ackerman's innovation  in constitutional the-
ory-the idea  of constitutional  amendments  outside  the framework  of Article  V-
may be less important than it appears.  The "amendments"  he identifies can be under-
stood, alternatively, as  realizations of the Declaration's  principles  and therefore not
amendments at all even though they are not formally embedded in the written Consti-
tution.  From this perspective,  after all, the written Constitution  always has been  an
imperfect realization  of the Declaration's principles.
20.  Wright, Address, supra note  15.
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decide whether to continue to pursue the course we have been pursu-
ing.  This expresses the Declaration's commitment to self-government.
The second mistake  is to offer a highly celebratory  account of the
choices we have made.  This account offers a story of essentially unin-
terrupted progress in  eliminating practices  inconsistent with the Dec-
laration's  principles.  "Sure,"  a  superficial  account  might  go,  "the
United  States  has  an  unfortunate  history  of  racism,  exemplified  by
slavery and the  apartheid  system that replaced  it, sexism,  and nativ-
ism.  But all those were mere aberrations.  Deep down we knew that
they were  inconsistent  with  the  Declaration's  principles,  sometimes
forced  on  us  by  considerations  of political  expediency.  But  when
political  circumstances  were  favorable,  the  people  of  the  United
States  moved to vindicate  the Declaration's  principles  and eliminate
these excrescences."
This celebration  is both risky and  erroneous.  As Professor Balkin
argues, the risk is self-satisfaction, in two forms.21  We may think that
we have gone quite a way towards realizing  the Declaration's princi-
ples, and need not work hard to "complete" the American project.  Or
we may think that whatever injustices we see around us somehow fall
outside the scope of the Declaration's project, and so that we need not
address them as we  continue to honor that project.
Our  economy's  failure  to  satisfy the  basic  needs  of  many  people
shows  that we have not come close to fulfilling the Declaration's pro-
ject.  We must keep that failure, and others, clearly in view.  We may
blur our ability to see  continuing injustice  if we  describe  contempo-
rary constitutional law too forcefully as carrying out the Declaration's
project.
A celebratory  account  is  wrong,  as well,  because  it does not  take
our  history  seriously  enough.  A real  constitutional  narrative  must
treat  racism, sexism,  nativism,  and  all those  other  "aberrations"  as
deep commitments of the people of the United States.  When Thomas
Jefferson wrote that "all men are created  equal,"  he excluded women
from large domains of social life even as he acknowledged  the equal
moral standing  of women and men.  The  Constitution  compromised
with slavery, failing to mention it but protecting it by allowing slave-
holders to count three-fifths  of the slave population toward represen-
tation  in  the House  of  Representatives.  Our  foreign  policy  in  the
twentieth  century has  been  imperialistic,  and  not  always  defensible
even as  a flawed effort to guarantee  fundamental  human rights else-
where in the world.
Perhaps our national self-understanding should not treat racism, se-
xism, and nativism  as  commitments  running as  deep  as  our commit-
ment to  the Declaration's  principles,  but  it must not  treat  them  as
21.  J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith,  65 Fordham
L. Rev.  1703,  1703 (1997).
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aberrations  that everyone  knew all along were inconsistent with who
we were.  Everyone  did not know that.  Many people were-and re-
main-entirely  comfortable  with  the  privileges  that  racism,  sexism,
and nativism  confer on them.  It demeans  our national experience  to
read  those  people  out  of  the  narrative.  Building  the  underside  of
United States  constitutional history into our narrative  gives it a rich-
ness  and complexity that in the end makes the story more attractive
than the purely celebratory account.  Acknowledging that Thomas Jef-
ferson owned  slaves, and that Martin Luther King, Jr. had numerous
personal flaws, deepens  our appreciation for what they accomplished.
As we realize that those who  did so much probably did not see their
own flaws  as we do, we may become appropriately humble as we pur-
sue our projects with a new awareness  of the  possibility that we  too
are flawed  and have a limited understanding  of our circumstances.
An analogy  on  the personal  level  is  helpful.  Consider  the stories
people  tell  about  their  families,  when  they  regard  the family  as  a
pretty good one on the whole.  One superficial narrative might include
some  stories about the family's black  sheep, no longer considered  by
the family as  part of itself.  Another  superficial  narrative might treat
such people as lovable rogues, fundamentally good people who had an
unfortunate  flaw or two.  But the best, the deepest, and most satisfy-
ing family narrative understands these people as deeply flawed, some-
times  even  evil,  whose  flaws  are  and  remain  the  family's
responsibility.
We can  turn  away from the narrative we have  constructed  to this
point, as we would were we to reject the New Deal.22  But we would
then  be  a  different  people-equally  self-constituted,  but  different.
And we would be a worse people, for two reasons.  First, we embark
on a project of reconstruction  that threatens  our national integrity in
rejecting  the narrative that has heretofore constituted  us as a people.
The analogy on  the individual level  is obvious:  As a matter of brute
fact, anyone can throw aside the deepest commitments he or she made
a decade  ago, but  doing so raises questions  about that person's  psy-
chological  and moral integrity.
In  addition, the synthetic historical narrative  by which  a  people is
constituted is valuable, but it is not the only thing of value in political
life.  It is a good thing that the people of the United States are consti-
tuted  by  the  Declaration's  principles,  because  those  principles  are
good ones.
Professor  Ackerman's  positivism  is  important  to  his  project,  be-
cause  a people  can  only be constituted  historically,  which  is to say,
22.  Note that I say turn away and reject, in place of Professor Ackerman's ignore.
The considered  rejection  of  the  narrative  previously  constructed  is,  I  think, much
more interesting than an ignorant departure from it, and considering such a rejection
produces more theoretical insight into the project Professor Ackerman  and I believe
important.
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positively.  In the end, however, I cannot avoid a criticism of the con-
tent he has given to the project.  Professor Ackerman has created un-
necessary difficulties for himself as we confront the possible rejection
of the New Deal regime because the Declaration's principles play so
little role in his narrative of how the people of the United States have
constituted ourselves.  It would be easier to see how the Declaration's
substantive  content provides  a  normative  ground  for preserving  the
accomplishments of the New Deal regime if the Declaration's princi-
ples played a larger role in Professor Ackerman's narrative.  It would
also make it easier for Professor Ackerman to integrate the two parts
of his  scholarship.  His constitutional  project  would then fit together
with his philosophical project of developing principles of social justice.
With  the Declaration  in  mind,  Professor Ackerman  could  offer  his
principles of social justice as a continuation  of the project  of the peo-
ple of the United States.
I conclude with an observation about the limits of Professor Acker-
man's positivism.  Even he acknowledges that a formal constitutional
amendment can repudiate our constitutional heritage.23  The Republi-
can Party platform  proposes to amend  the Constitution  to eliminate
automatic  citizenship for  all  persons born  in  the United  States  (and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof).'  Neither he nor his formalist ad-
versaries have a constitutional  ground on which to oppose that propo-
23.  Ackerman, supra note 2, at 14-15.
24. Professor Ackerman's colleagues Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith have argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment's  first sentence  does not require  automatic citizen-
ship, and that the courts should reinterpret  the sentence to refer only  to children  of
those lawfully admitted for permanent  residence. See Peter K.  Schuck & Rogers M.
Smith,  Citizenship Without Consent:  Illegal Aliens in the American Polity 75-86, 116-
17 (1985).  Their catalogue of reasons why such a reinterpretation  is legitimate shows
liberal interpretive principles coming home to roost:
[Tiheoretical  ambivalence on the part of the Fourteenth Amendment's fram-
ers concerning the basis for citizenship; the inconsistencies  that have always
pervaded American citizenship  law, the contemporary  irrelevance  of many
of the reasons that led courts to perpetuate the medieval ascriptive principle
in the past; and the existence  of policy considerations today that increase the
practical and theoretical  attractiveness  of [their alternative  proposal].  It is
appropriate  for  the judiciary  to  adopt  this  reinterpretation  because  it  is
chiefly  the judiciary  that  created  the  rival  common-law  understanding  of
political membership and defended it as authoritative ....  [A] judicial rein-
terpretation is possible where, as here, its original reading of ambiguous lan-
guage reflected policies  and principles  at variance with most contemporary
views  of American  constitutional  theory  and  with  current national  policy
objectives.
Id.
This sounds as close to dynamic (constitutional) interpretation as I can imagine.  As
far as I know they have made no progress in convincing people that the Republican
platform plank is unnecessary,  although the platform does refer as well to "constitu-
tionally valid legislation"  as an alternative to accomplish  the party's purposes. Dole,
Kemp Accept Republican Nominations at Party Convention  in California, Key Points
in the 1996 Republican Party Platform, Facts on File World News  Dig., Aug. 15,  1996,
at 574 Al  (available  in LEXIS, NEWS  Library, CURNWS  File).
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sal:  Formalists must accept what the people do through the Article V
process;  Professor  Ackerman  must  accept  whatever  considered  self-
definition  the people  construct. 25  If, as  I believe,  the  people of  the
United States  are constituted by our commitment to the Declaration's
principles  as  imperfectly  realized  in  the  Constitution,  we  do  have a
constitutional reason  for  opposing  the  Republican  proposal:  It  in-
volves  turning  our  backs  not  only on history,  which we  as  a people
surely can do, but on the Declaration's principles, which we as a peo-
ple ought not do.  In short, I can say, as I do not think Professor Ack-
erman can, that the Republican proposal to amend the Constitution is
anti-constitutional.26
25.  I can imagine, just barely,  an argument that some formal  amendments-the
Eighteenth being a prime candidate-do not reflect the people's considered  judgment
even though they result from Article  V's extensive super-majoritarian  processes.  To
show how difficult developing such an argument would be, I refer readers to a recent
argument that the Seventeenth  Amendment-one  of the better ones,  to my mind-
was adopted in part because of crass political considerations.  See Ronald F. King &
Susan  Ellis,  Partisan  Advantage and Constitutional Change:  The  Case of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, 10 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 69 (1996).
26.  It should go without  saying that I do not mean to imply  that, were  such an
amendment adopted,  the courts  would not have  to enforce  it.  In my constitutional
universe, the Constitution and what the courts do, and ought to do, are two domains
that only partially overlap.
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